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Abstract  
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is considered a key technology option for abating CO2 
emissions in carbon-intensive sectors, e.g. the power sector. However, high investment costs and 
risk hinder the diffusion of CCS. To avoid stranded assets or high future costs for retrofitting, new 
plants can be made carbon capture ready (CCR) to enable them to accommodate future CCS 
retrofitting at low additional costs. Current CCR investment decisions are closely related to future 
CCS retrofitting and CCS operation decisions in subsequent stages, all of which would be affected 
by uncertainties. We develop a three-stage CCR investment decision model under multiple 
uncertainties which allows for investment and especially operating flexibilities. Applying this 
model to China shows that CCS operating flexibility under the carbon-pricing scheme may 
actually lower the probability of investing in a CCR plant, and neglecting it may overestimate the 
propensity for investing in CCR. Moreover, learning effects, which reduce the costs of future CCS 
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retrofitting, may be detrimental to CCR investment, indicating that the policy support for research 
on, development of, and deployment of CCS to reduce CCS costs should be coordinated with 
CCR investments. Although higher electricity prices can increase the value of an investment 
opportunity, it may restrain CCR investment. Finally, CCR investment does not appear to be 
economically viable under current conditions in China because of low carbon prices, high carbon 
price risks, high CCR investment costs and the high opportunity costs of CCS operation. 
Key words: Carbon capture ready (CCR); Carbon pricing; Greenhouse gas (GHG); Investment 
under uncertainty; Dynamic programming 
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1 Introduction  
To reduce the risks and catastrophic effects of climate change, 195 countries signed the Paris 
Agreement in December 2015. In this first-ever legally binding global climate deal governments 
agreed to the long-term goal of keeping global average temperature increase well below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels while aiming to limit the increase to 1.5°C. The power sector is 
responsible for more than 40% of total global energy-related CO2 emissions and needs to be 
decarbonized to realize the climate target (IEA, 2013a). While in several countries new sources of 
energy have started to gradually change the energy landscape, about two-thirds of global 
electricity is still produced from the fossil fuels coal (41.3%), natural gas (21.7%), and oil (4.4%) 
(IEA, 2015a). 
While large European countries such as Germany, France and the UK tend to focus on 
renewable and nuclear energy sources, carbon capture and storage (CCS) is considered a key 
technology in the effort to realize large-scale CO2 emission abatement, especially in emerging 
economies such as China and India (IEA, 2010a). So far though, plant operators have been slow to 
invest in CCS because the related costs and risks involved are high (IEA, 2013b). More 
specifically, adding CCS to any process increases capital costs, requiring additional expenditure 
for CO2 capture and compression equipment or for CO2 transportation and storage. CCS also 
incurs higher operating costs since energy is required to separate the CO2 from the exhaust 
streams, resulting in about a 10% loss in power plant efficiency (Sekar, 2005; Abadie and 
Chamorro, 2008; Rohlfs and Madlener, 2011). Thus, CCS is profitable only if carbon costs are 
sufficiently high, e.g., because a carbon tax or an emissions trading system (ETS) is in place.
1
 The 
                                                             
1
 Unlike under a carbon tax, the carbon costs involved in an ETS are volatile since the price of the CO2 certificates 
is endogenously determined by supply and demand. Companies with high CO2 abatement costs may find it more 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
4 
 
investment risks that accompany a CCS installation include uncertainty about future prices (of fuel, 
electricity, and CO2 certificates), technology performance, investment costs, regulation, and 
acceptance of CCS by civil society (IEA, 2007a). These potential disadvantages increase the 
likelihood that new fossil fuel power plants will be built without a CO2 abatement option.  
To avoid the risk of stranded assets or the high costs of retrofitting should future market or 
regulatory conditions change,
2
 new fossil fuel plants can be made carbon capture ready (CCR) so 
they can easily accommodate future carbon capture equipment. Thus, CCR provides the investor 
with the option of retrofitting a plant with CCS in the future at lower costs than those he would 
have to incur if he had invested in a conventional plant (a Non-CCR plant). A CCR plant, however, 
incurs higher initial investment costs than a Non-CCR plant (IEA, 2007b). In addition, when 
deciding among competing projects investors also need to take into account future CCS 
retrofitting and operating decisions. In particular, even if a CCS retrofit were to be implemented, 
market conditions may later turn out to favor running the plant in CCS-off mode (to avoid the 
efficiency loss) and to acquire the desired number of certificates on the CO2-certificates market 
instead (Mo and Zhu, 2014). Furthermore, high capital expenditure and the irreversibility of a 
CCS retrofit investment may lead investors to delay CCS retrofitting until market and regulatory 
conditions improve (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Abadie and Chamorro, 2008). 
In summary, to make correct power plant investment decisions operators must navigate 
through three stages of decision-making: (i) the initial decision between investing in a CCR plant 
                                                                                                                                                                              
profitable to purchase these certificates than to install abatement technology. For example, the EU ETS has been in 
place since 2005 and is considered the key EU climate policy instrument for reducing carbon emissions 
cost-efficiently. Since 2013 China has been experimenting with ETSs in seven regions. These pilot schemes are 
scheduled to be replaced by a national ETS in 2017. In this paper we assume that an ETS is in place. Carbon prices 
then refer to the prices of CO2 certificates. 
2 “Stranded assets” here means that companies risk investing in plants with long lifetimes of typically 40 years or 
more (IEA, 2007b) that—unless they can be retrofitted with CCS technology—will later be banned by law or 
become too expensive to operate because of more stringent emission regulations. 
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or a Non-CCR plant; (ii) the decision whether and when to implement a CCS retrofit, and (iii) the 
decision whether to operate in CCS mode. Finally, a plant manager has the option of permanently 
shutting down a plant during the period corresponding to each stage if the manager expects that 
continuing to operate the plant will be a losing proposition. Clearly, decisions at each stage will be 
affected by investment and operating decisions made in the preceding stages. As a consequence, 
the CCR investment decision is a multi-stage decision problem under high risk. 
So far only a few studies have focused on CCR investment. Bohm et al. (2007) summarizes 
the CCR investment options for pulverized coal (PC) plants and integrated gasification and 
combined cycle (IGCC) plants, and estimate the net present value (NPV) of plants for a range of 
CCR pre-investment levels. Because many uncertainties affect the profitability of a CCR 
investment, several studies involved probabilistic analyses of CCR investment. For example, 
Rochedo and Szklo (2013) assessed the profitability of investing in CCR for coal-based power 
plants, varying the timing of CCS retrofitting. Their findings showed that pre-investments in CCR 
are profitable only when the retrofitting of CCS occurs in the near future. However, the framework 
employed by Rochedo and Szklo (2013) did not allow for flexibility in CCR investments or 
operations. As management flexibility may play an important role in investment decision-making 
under uncertainty (Fleten and Näsäkkälä, 2010; Heydari et al., 2012), Liang et al. (2009) assessed 
the value of CCR in newly built PC-fired power plants, allowing for timing flexibility of the CCS 
retrofit. Their findings indicate that the value of CCR is significantly understated without 
sufficient timing flexibility. Based on a multi-factor real options model, Rohlfs and Madlener 
(2011, 2013) evaluated CCR investment in a coal plant. They found that CCR investment turned 
out to be profitable only under very specific conditions, such as a high and stable carbon price, 
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and the CCR plant option is typically dominated by other technology options. 
While Liang et al. (2009) and Rohlfs and Madlener (2011, 2013) allow for flexibility in the 
timing of CCS retrofitting, they do not consider CCS operating flexibility. Likewise, no study has 
yet considered the effects of interaction between the various investment and operating flexibilities 
on the CCR investment decision. In addition, the CCR investment decision is driven mostly by 
relevant policy, e.g. carbon pricing policy, research and development (R&D) policy, and energy 
pricing policy. However, the effect of any such policy may be vague and even detrimental to CCR 
investment, as a result of the complexity of the investment decision, and it should be evaluated 
cautiously to avoid possible policy failure or conflicts. The extant literature has not explored in 
depth the impact of relevant policy on the decision to invest in CCR. 
In this paper we first develop a CCR investment decision model using the dynamic 
programming method, which captures the investment and operational flexibilities in the three 
decision stages and allows for multiple uncertainties. Then we parameterize the model for a newly 
built supercritical pulverized coal plant in China, as China is the world’s largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases, and the power sector contributes about 50% of total energy-related CO2 
emissions (IEA, 2015b). We then use Monte Carlo simulation methods to accommodate the 
complexity of the decision model and least-square methods (LSM) to improve the accuracy of the 
solution. Based on this model, we explore the impact of CCR investment on CCS retrofitting and 
CO2 abatement, of operating flexibility on CCR investment and, in particular, of key policy factors, 
e.g. carbon pricing, electricity pricing, and learning effect of CCS driven by R&D, on investment 
in CCR. 
Thus, we contribute to the extant literature by building a novel CCR investment decision 
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model under multiple uncertainties involving a three-stage decision process and various decision 
flexibilities. In particular, allowing for CCS operating flexibility more adequately reflects actual 
plant operating conditions (Chalmers et al., 2009). While these features increase the complexity of 
the analysis compared with previous approaches, they also allow for novel, arguably surprising, 
insights. For example, we show that operating flexibility may lower the probability that an 
operator will invest in CCR under the carbon pricing policy. Thus, analyses neglecting CCS 
operating flexibility may overestimate the propensity for investing in a CCR plant. Furthermore, 
we show that learning effects, which bring down the costs of CCS retrofitting, may be detrimental 
to CCR investment. Finally, we found that higher electricity prices lower the probability that a 
given operator will invest in a CCR plant. The novel results referred to above may have significant 
policy implications in practice. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the CCR investment decision 
model in detail. Section 3 presents the key parameters of the case study, and Section 4 presents the 
main simulation results. Section 5 discusses the main findings and concludes. 
2 Modeling CCR investment under uncertainty 
This section presents our novel three-stage CCR investment decision model. First, in Section 
2.1 we model uncertainties affecting CCR investment in China. Then in Section 2.2 we present the 
decision process related to CCR investment. Section 2.3 introduces our approach to solving the 
model. 
2.1 Modeling uncertainties  
Investors in CCR for new power plants face uncertain future costs and revenues, because 
electricity prices, fuel prices, and carbon prices are uncertain. We assume that these prices follow 
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stochastic processes. In general, electricity prices show short-run and a long-run dynamics 
(Schwartz and Smith, 2000; Abadie and Chamorro, 2008). Short-run behavior displays mean 
reversion, seasonality, and stochastic volatility, while long-term behavior is determined by 
equilibrium price dynamics. In liberalized electricity markets, the short-run characteristics affect 
plant operation, as prices may vary significantly. In China, however, the electricity market is still 
regulated, and the benchmark electricity prices are determined by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC). In fact, electricity prices in China are typically adjusted once a year 
only and sometimes remain unchanged even for longer periods of time. Therefore, the short-run 
behavior of electricity prices has little effect on plant operations in China, which are instead driven 
by long-run dynamics. In addition, current on-grid electricity prices in China are generally 
considered low (OVO Energy, 2011; Statista, 2015), but they are expected to increase in the wake 
of future market-oriented reforms (Zhou et al., 2010; Zhu, 2012; Mo et al., 2016). Following the 
literature (e.g. i.e. Zhou et al., 2010; Rohlfs and Madlener, 2011; Zhu, 2012; Mo et al., 2016) we 
therefore employ a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) process to model the long-run trend for 
and volatility of electricity prices in China.
3
 
The evolution of coal prices seems to be mean-reverting over a very long period of time, 
although the reversion is slow and often takes as long as a decade. According to Pindyck (1999) 
mean reversion in the coal market takes about ten years. However, current coal prices in China are 
low, mainly because of excess coal production capacity in the past. Since the Chinese government 
has started to implement measures to reduce excess capacity, the coal supply is expected to shrink 
                                                             
3  In comparison, electricity price dynamics for liberalized electricity markets have been modeled as a 
mean-reverting process (e.g. Abadie and Chamorro, 2008). As a drawback, simulations using a GBM may 
generate some paths with extremely high electricity prices. However, since the probability of extremely high 
electricity prices is low, the main simulation results for the CCR investment decision as presented in Section 4 will 
not change. 
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and coal prices are expected to rise in the mid to long term. Exploring the implications of energy 
price model choice for investment decisions, the empirical results reported by Pindyck (1999) 
further suggest that employing a GBM process is unlikely to lead to large errors in irreversible 
investment decisions for which energy prices are key stochastic variables. Like Siddiqui et al. 
(2007), Kumbaroğlu et al. (2008), Fuss et al. (2008), Liang (2009), and Zhu and Fan (2012), we 
model coal price evolution as a GBM. 
Current carbon prices are relatively low but are expected to increase gradually with the 
carbon budget becoming more stringent in the mid- and long-term future, reflecting the world’s 
commitment to take on more ambitious carbon emission reduction targets over time. Meanwhile 
the evolution of carbon prices is subject to many uncertain factors, reflecting uncertainty in both 
supply and demand factors that affect prices. We therefore model future carbon prices also as a 
GBM process. 
More specifically, Equation (1) describes the evolution of the various prices as follows: 
i t i i t i i t i tdP P dt P dW                                                     (1)  
where 1,2,3i  , and 1 tP , 2 tP  and 3 tP   represent the coal price, the electricity price, and the 
carbon price, respectively; i  stands for the price drift rate; i  
is the instantaneous price 
volatility; and i tdW   is the increment to a standard Wiener process, which is assumed to be 
normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of dt . 
Further, the risk-neutral form of the process is as follows 
( )i t i i i t i i t i tdP P dt P dW                                                (2)                                  
where i is the risk premium, and ( )i i  is the risk-adjusted drift rate (Dixit and Pindyck 
1994). 
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Let ln( )i t i tX P  ; applying Ito’s Lemma yields 
21( )
2i t i i i i i t
dX dt dW                                             (3) 
In the numerical study we use a discrete approximation as follows to simulate the price 
evolution:  
1
2 2
( 1)
1exp[( ) ( ) ]
2i t i t i i i i t
P P t t           
                               
(4) 
In addition, to allow electricity, coal, and carbon prices to be correlated, we add the following 
conditions (Dixit and Pindyck 1994): 
1 2 1 2
1 3 1 3
2 3 2 3
,
,
.
t t
t t
t t
dW dW dt
dW dW dt
dW dW dt



  
  
  



 
                                                   (5) 
where 1 2  , 1 3   and 2 3  are the coefficients of correlation, which reflect the extent to which 
both series move together beyond their trends. 
2.2 Modeling CCR investment decision 
The lifetime of a power plant lasts from period 0 to period T, and can be divided into three 
stages (see Figure 1)
4
: period 0 to period T2 (Stage 1), period T2+1 to period Tr (Stage 2) and 
period Tr+1 until the end of the lifetime of the power plant in period T (Stage 3). In the first stage, 
at the beginning of the decision process an investor decides what type of plant to build, a 
conventional Non-CCR plant or a CCR plant. The construction of the plant will be finished at T1, 
and it is assumed that a carbon pricing system is introduced at T2.
5
 Between T1 and T2, the 
investor may decommission the plant in advance if he anticipates that keeping the plant running 
would reduce total profits. In the second stage, from T2+1 on, the investor first decides in each 
                                                             
4 In the case study, one period corresponds to one-quarter of a year. 
5 In our case study we assume that plant construction will take two years, i.e. eight periods. In addition, we 
assume that the carbon pricing policy is introduced after the plant construction is finished at T2. However, if it was 
already in place when the investment decision was made, there would be no decision about whether to 
decommission the plant in stage 1. In this case, after finishing power plant construction at T1, the investor would 
face the decision described in stage 2.  
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period whether to decommission the power plant; if he chooses to continue operating the plant, 
then he must decide whether to retrofit the plant with CCS immediately or delay the retrofit. Tr 
denotes the period of retrofitting (T2<=Tr<=T), which should be decided by optimization. In the 
third stage, i.e., from Tr+N to T,
6
 in each period the investor again first decides whether to 
decommission the plant in advance, and then decides whether to run the plant in CCS-mode to 
abate CO2 emission or to suspend CCS operation temporarily depending on market conditions if 
continuing operating the plant is adopted. Thus, the CCR investment decision is affected by the 
CCS retrofit decision in stage 2 and by the CCS operation decision in stage 3. We therefore 
employ dynamic programming methods and begin the formal presentation of our model with the 
final stage.  
============================================== 
Fig. 1 The decision process involved in CCR investment in new power plant 
============================================== 
 
Stage 3: from period Tr+N to period T 
From Tr+N on, the investor may—as in previous stages—decide whether to decommission 
the plant in advance in any period. He may then decide whether to operate the plant in CCS mode 
or not. 
We assume that the investor wants to maximize net cash flow in each period. The decision 
problem for each period in Stage 3 then becomes: 
 2
2
,
 ,
SCC CC
SCC CC
t t
t t
Abate  CO   emission if CF CF
Suspend CO abatement if CF CF
   
 
                                   (6) 
where 
CC
tCF  and 
SCC
tCF are the cash flows when operating in CCS mode and CCS-off mode, 
                                                             
6 It is assumed that it takes N periods to retrofit the plant with CCS. In the case study, the CCS retrofit takes one 
year, so N=4. 
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respectively, in period t.
7
  
The optimized cash flow is then
8
 
( , )SCC CCt t tCF MAX CF CF                                               (7) 
The investor will close the plant in period t if the expected economic value from continuing 
to operate the plant 
3
tV  is less than the NPV from decommissioning the plant:
A
tNPV .
9
 
3
3
, ( )
  ,  ( )
t
t
t
t
A
t
A
t
Decommission the plant if E V NPV
Continue operating the the plant if E V NPV
 



  
(T N t T)r                 (8) 
3
tV can be expressed as 
33 ( , ( ))
t t
r t A
t t t t t VV CF e MAX NPV E 
 
                                     (9)   
where r is the discount rate and t is the time step of each period.  
The optimized economic value in period t is 
3 3( , ( ))At t tF MAX NPV E V                                               (10) 
Equation (10) then becomes the basis for the decision whether to retrofit the plant with CCS 
in Stage 2. The boundary condition of 
3
tV  in the final period T is 
3
T TV CF                                                              (11) 
The boundary condition (11) allows 
3
tV and 
3
tF  to be solved backwards. 
Stage 2: from period T2+1 to period Tr 
Unless the investor decommissions the plant, he decides whether to immediately retrofit the 
plant with CCS or to delay the retrofit. In the latter case, the investor has to pay for all CO2 
emissions in that period. If he invests in CCS in period t (from T2+1 to Tr), the total NPV is 
3rN t CCS outlay
t t N tNPV e F C
  
                                            (12)     
                                                             
7 See the details on the calculation of the net cash flow in each period 
CC
tCF and 
SCC
tCF in Appendix A. 
8 The optimal cash flow can be zero if the greater of the cash flows from CCS mode and CCS-off mode is zero. 
9 For simplicity we assume that decommissioning the plant yields a net cash flow of 0. 
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where 
CCS outlay
tC

 is the investment cost of a CCS retrofit in period t and 
3
t NF   is the expected 
NPV of the future net cash flow from period t+N to period T after retrofitting the power plant (i.e., 
equation 10).  
If the investor delays the retrofit, the economic value of the investment opportunity becomes 
2 2( , ( ))BR r tt t t t t t tV CF e MAX NPV E V
 
                                  (13)   
where 
BR
tCF is the cash flow before a CCS retrofit in period t and after the government 
introduced the carbon pricing system in T2.
10
 
The CCS retrofit investment in Stage 2 is then governed by the following decision rule for 
each t: 
 22 ., ( ),) ( ) t
t
t t t
t t t
Retrofit plant with CCS immediately if E NPV E
Delay the CCS retrofit,if E NPV E
V
V
   
  


                   (14) 
The optimized economic value from continuing to operate the plant in period t is 
2 2( ( ), ( ))t t t t tf MAX E NPV E V                                            (15) 
The decision rules for deciding whether to decommission the plant become 
2
2
,
 ,
A
t t
A
t t
Decommission the plant if f NPV
Continue operating the plant if f NPV
  
 


  
                             (16) 
Then, the optimized economic value in period t in the second stage is 
2 2
( , )
A
t t tMAXF f NPV                                                                    (17) 
Equation (17) allows us to derive the optimized economic value at time ( 2T t ), 
2
2T t
F

, 
which the investor takes into account when making a decision in Stage 1. 
At time T, the investor has no incentive to invest in a CCS retrofit, because there is no time 
left to recover the investment costs. Then, the total expected NPV from delaying the CCS 
                                                             
10 Appendix A shows in detail how 
BR
jCF  is calculated. 
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investment at time T 
2
TV  is (boundary condition) 
2 (0, )BRT TV MAX CF  
                                                   (18) 
where 
BR
TCF  is the cash flow in period T before the CCS retrofit. Equation (18) allows us to 
solve for 
2
tV ,
2
tf  and 
2
t
F  backwards. 
Stage 1: from period 0 to period T2 
We can divide this stage into two parts arranged in chronological order. At the beginning of 
the plant investment decision period T0, the investor first decides what type of plant to build—a 
traditional Non-CCR plant or a CCR plant. After the plant construction is finished in period T1, he 
has the option of decommissioning the plant in advance until T2 when carbon pricing is introduced. 
Also, we describe the decision process in reverse order. 
In period t 1 2( )T t T  , continuing operating the plant yields the NPV 
1
tV  
 
1 1( , ( ))BETS r t At t t t t t tV CF e MAX NPV E V
 
                                 (19)  
where 
BETS
tCF  is the cash flow in period t before carbon pricing is introduced.
11
 Note that in 
each period of this stage there is no regulation of CO2 emissions. The decision whether to 
decommission the plant after the plant has been built before T2 when carbon pricing is introduced 
is as follows: 
1
1
, ( )
  , ( )
A
t t t
A
t t t
Decommission the plant if E V NPV
Continue  operating the plant if E V NPV
  
 



                            (20) 
The optimized economic value in each period t is  
1 1( ( ), )At t t tF MAX E V NPV                                               (21) 
Based on equation (21), we can derive the optimized economic value at time T1, 
1
1
TF . 
The boundary condition in period T2 is then 
                                                             
11 For details on how to calculate the net cash flow in each period 
BETS
kCF , see Appendix A. 
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2 2 2
1 2BETS r t
T T T tV CF e F
 
                                                  (22) 
where 
2
2
T tF   is obtained from Stage 2 (equation 17). In period T0, the investor decides what type 
of plant to build. The economic values of the CCR plant (
0
CCR
TS ) and Non-CCR plant ( 0
NCCR
TS ) are 
as follows: 
1 0
0 0 1
( ) 1r T TCCR CCR CCR
T T TS C e F
                                                (23) 
1 0
0 0 1
( ) 1r T TNCCR NCCR NCCR
T T TS C e F
                                             (24) 
where 
0
CCR
TC and 0
NCCR
TC are the investment costs of the CCR plant and the Non-CCR plant, 
respectively, and 
1
1 CCR
TF

and
1
1 NCCR
TF

are the expected net present value of the CCR plant and the 
Non-CCR plant in period T1, which can be obtained from equation (21). 
Then the decision between building a CCR plant and building a Non-CCR plant is governed 
by 
 0 0
0 0
,
,
CCR NCCR
T T
CCR NCCR
T T
Build Non CCR plant if S S
Build CCR plant if S S
    
   
                                     (25) 
2.3 Solution to the model  
There are several numerical methods that could be used to simulate the uncertainties and 
solve the model, e.g. lattice methods and Monte Carlo simulation methods (Cox et al., 1979; 
Brandão and Dyer, 2005; Judd, 1998). In this work, we use Monte Carlo methods to simulate the 
evolution of the multidimensional uncertainties described in Section 2.1, and we then employ 
dynamic programming methods to solve the model recursively from period T to T0. In particular, 
to improve the accuracy of the estimation of the continuation values 
1( )t tE V , 
2( )t tE V , 
3( )t tE V  
and ( )t tE NPV , we use the least squares Monte Carlo simulation methods proposed by Longstaff 
and Schwartz (2001) and widely employed by Gamba and Fusari (2009), Cortazar et al. (2008), 
etc. To be more specific, we first regressed the economic values in each period (
1 2 3, ,t t tV V V and 
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tNPV ) on a linear combination of a set of basic functions of stochastic variables (coal price 1 tP , 
electricity price 2 tP  and carbon prices 3 tP  ): 
2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 1 3 2 3
2 2 2
4 4 1 4 2 4 3 4 1 4 2 4 3
4 1 2 4 1 3 4 2
       + , ( 1,2,3);
             
i
t i i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t t i t t i t t i t
t t t t t t t
t t t t
V a b P c P d P e P f P g P
h P P k P P l P P i
NPV a b P c P d P e P f P g P
h P P k P P l P

     
      
     
   
      
   
      
   3 4+t t tP   







                 (25) 
We can then estimate the parameters in the equations above 
( , , , , , , , , , ; 1,2,3,4.i i i i i i i i i ia b c d e f g h k l i  ) using least squares. Relying on these estimated 
regression parameters and the simulated stochastic variables we calculated the estimator for the 
expected economic values (
1( )t tE V , 
2( )t tE V , 
3( )t tE V  and ( )t tE NPV ): 
2 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 1 3 2 3
2 2 2
4 4 1 4 2 4 3 4 1 4 2 4 3
4 1 2 4 1 3
( )
       , ( 1,2,3);
( )
             
i
t t i i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t t i t t i t t
t t t t t t t t
t t t t
E V a b P c P d P e P f P g P
h P P k P P l P P i
E NPV a b P c P d P e P f P g P
h P P k P P l
     
     
     
   
      
   
      
   4 2 3t tP P 







              (26) 
To check the robustness of the results, we also included the higher order of the stochastic 
variables. While this significantly increased processing time, the results were very similar. 
Based on the methods presented above and decision rules stipulated in section 2.2, we can 
obtain the results on each of the simulated paths, e.g. whether to invest in CCR at the beginning, 
whether and when to retrofit the plant with CCS in future, and the carbon abatement during the 
entire lifetime of the plant. The presentation of our simulation results focuses on the probability of 
CCS retrofitting, the expected CO2 abatement, the probability of CCR investment, and the trigger 
carbon prices that are intended to induce CCR investment. We first compute the probability of 
CCS retrofitting as the number of simulated paths in which a CCS retrofit is implemented 
according to Equation (14) divided by the total number of simulated paths. The expected CO2 
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abatement is simply the average of the CO2 abatement amounts during the entire lifetime of the 
plant obtained on all the simulated paths, based on Equation (A.14). The probability of CCR 
investment is computed as the number of paths along which a CCR plant is the optimal choice, 
based on Equation (25) divided by the total number of simulated paths. Finally, we calculate the 
trigger carbon price as the carbon price level above which the probability of building a CCR plant 
is greater than that of building a Non-CCR-plant, or more specifically the carbon price level above 
which the probability of building a CCR plant is higher than 50%. That is, for carbon prices that 
exceed the trigger price, the investor is more likely to choose a CCR plant than a Non-CCR plant. 
3 Case study 
China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and the power sector contributes 
about 50% of China’s total energy-related CO2 emissions (IEA, 2013c). Several studies suggest 
that a significant number of thermal power plants need to be built to meet future electricity 
demand in China, which is expected to grow rapidly (e.g. IEA, 2012). For our case study 
simulations, we chose a supercritical pulverized coal (SCPC) plant, as it is a mature technology, 
and is currently the dominant option for new coal-fired power plants in China (IEA, 2010; Wang 
and Du, 2016). Table 1 and Table 2 display the relevant technical and economic parameters for a 
CCR plant and a Non-CCR plant.
12
 
============================================= 
Table 1 Technical parameters 
============================================= 
============================================== 
Table 2 Economic parameters 
                                                             
12 The exchange rate used is 1 USD=6.5 RMB, which was taken from the Bloomberg website in January 2016. 
Since there currently is no futures market in China, and the spot market is still regulated, most parameters shown 
in Table 2 are taken from the literature (i.e. Abadie and Chamorro, 2008; Liang et al., 2009; Rohlfs and Madlener, 
2011; and Mo et al., 2016)). Thus, the parameters are based mainly on data from mature spot and futures markets 
such as the European Energy Exchange and the European Climate Exchange. 
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============================================== 
 
4 Simulation results 
In this section, the impact of initial CCR investment on future CCS retrofitting and CO2 
abatement is presented, and then the key factors driving current CCR investment are explored.  
4.1 The impact of CCR investment on CCS retrofit and CO2 abatement 
We first analyze the impact of the initial CCR investment on a future CCS retrofit and CO2 
abatement for a range of initial carbon prices (see Table 3). Our range of carbon prices reflects the 
carbon prices observed in the carbon emission trading pilot schemes in China. These prices range 
from 20RMB/t CO2 to 120RMB/t CO2, with an average carbon price of about 50 RMB/t CO2. 
Even in the low carbon price scenario (20 RMB/t CO2) the probability of a CCS retrofit for the 
CCR plant is quite high (about 86%), and increases with a higher initial carbon price. For all 
initial carbon prices considered, the probability of a CCS retrofit for a CCR plant is higher than 
that for a Non-CCR plant. In addition, we calculate the difference in the probability of a CCS 
retrofit between a CCR plant and a Non-CCR plant over a range of carbon price levels. As shown 
in Table 3, this difference increases for lower carbon prices. While this result is unsurprising per se, 
it also implies that the effect of CCR investment on a CCS retrofit in the future is more significant 
if the carbon price is low. Finally, for all carbon prices considered, the CO2 abatement by the plant 
is also higher for the CCR plant than for the Non-CCR plant. As expected, CCR investment in the 
initial stage increases CO2 abatement. For higher carbon prices considered, the difference in 
abatement is also greater because the plant is more likely to be operated in CCS mode (and abate 
more emissions) with high carbon prices than with low carbon prices. 
    ============================================== 
Table 3 The impact of initial CCR investment on future CCS retrofitting and CO2 abatement 
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    ============================================== 
4.2 Effects of allowing for CCS operating flexibility 
Since a novel aspect of the model is that we allow for CCS operating flexibility in the 
investment decision under the carbon emission trading scheme, we explored the impact of this 
flexibility on CCS retrofitting, CO2 abatement, and especially the CCR investment decision. As 
shown in Figure 2, the probability of a CCS retrofit is higher with CCS operating flexibility than 
without such flexibility for both the CCR plant and the Non-CCR plant in all carbon price 
scenarios. With CCS operating flexibility incorporated in the model, the investor can switch off 
CCS operation and instead purchase CO2 certificates on the market if carbon prices are low. In 
essence, the operating flexibility cushions the irreversibility of the CCS retrofit investment, 
thereby increasing the propensity to invest in a CCS retrofit. Figure 2 further illustrates that the 
effect of operating flexibility on CCS retrofitting is greater for lower initial carbon prices, 
indicating that operating flexibility should not be neglected in the current situation. 
============================================== 
Fig. 2 The effect of operating flexibility (OF) on CCS retrofitting 
============================================== 
 
In principle, operating flexibility has two countervailing effects on CO2 abatement. First, as 
just discussed, operating flexibility promotes CCS retrofitting, which then increases the possibility 
of abating CO2 emissions. Second, operating flexibility enables investors to suspend CCS 
operation and CO2 abatement temporarily if future market conditions are not favorable. The net 
effect on emission abatement depends on the relative magnitude of these countervailing effects of 
operating flexibility. As shown in Figure 3, the amount of CO2 abated with operating flexibility is 
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less than that without CCS operating flexibility, which indicates that for our scenarios the latter 
effect dominates. Consequently, although CCS operating flexibility promotes CCS retrofitting, it 
decreases the amount of CO2 abated. Figure 3 further suggests that the magnitude of this effect 
varies with the carbon price. For the CCR plant, the difference is greatest for carbon prices of 60 
and 80 RMB/tCO2 and significantly smaller for the lower and higher carbon prices considered. 
============================================== 
Fig. 3 The effect of operating flexibility (OF) on CO2 abatement 
============================================== 
CCS operating flexibility affects the current decision regarding plant type by affecting future 
CO2 abatement and CCS retrofitting. Figure 4 displays the impact of CCS operating flexibility on 
the decision between investing in a CCR plant or a Non-CCR plant. Accordingly, the probability 
of investing in a CCR plant is higher when the plant does not allow for operating flexibility. Thus, 
operating flexibility renders a CCR plant less attractive. Figure 4 further suggests that the 
hampering effect of operating flexibility on CCR investment is weaker for low carbon prices and 
high carbon prices in our scenarios and peaks at a price of 90 RMB/tCO2. Current research on the 
interaction of options concludes that there are “decreasing returns” to additional flexibility. Thus, 
adding flexibility when there are multiple options contributes less to the valuation of an 
investment than when there is a single option only (Trigeorgis, 1993). In comparison, our 
simulation results illustrate that the contribution of one additional option has to be assessed within 
the specific context of the market and policy environment. 
============================================== 
Fig. 4 The impact of the operating flexibility (OF) on CCR investment 
============================================== 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
21 
 
4.3 Other key factors driving CCR investment  
In this section, we analyze other key factors affecting the choice between building a CCR 
plant or a Non-CCR plant. We further calculate the trigger carbon prices under a range of market 
and policy conditions. 
1) Carbon prices 
The carbon price level and carbon price risk shape the decision to invest in a CCR plant by 
affecting CCS investment and operation. The left panel of Figure 5 shows the CCR investment 
probabilities for scenarios at various carbon price levels and carbon price volatilities (10%, 15%, 
20%, and 25%). As expected, higher carbon price volatility discourages investment in CCR plants. 
Figure 5 further suggests that, under current average prices observed in China’s pilot schemes, i.e., 
50RMB/tCO2, investment in CCR plants is rather unlikely, even if the volatility of the carbon 
price is low. 
The right panel of Figure 5 illustrates that the trigger carbon price is higher under higher 
carbon price volatility and increases at an increasing rate. By definition, the trigger price curve 
seen in Figure 6 describes the combinations of initial carbon prices and carbon price volatility, 
where the investor is indifferent between investing in a CCR plant and investing in a Non-CCR 
plant. In the base case scenario of carbon price volatility (15%), the trigger carbon price is about 
92 RMB/t CO2, which is higher than the current average carbon price in China’s ETS pilots. 
============================================== 
Fig. 5 The impact of carbon prices on CCR investment decisions and trigger carbon prices in a range of 
carbon price volatility scenarios 
============================================== 
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2) Timing of introducing carbon pricing policy 
Even when a country or a region has announced the introduction of an ETS, the timing may 
be uncertain. For example, when the Chinese national ETS was originally announced it was set to 
start in 2015, but it was unlikely to get off the ground before the end of 2017. We therefore 
explore how the timing of an ETS introduction will affect the plant type choice. The left panel of 
Figure 6 shows that, over a range of carbon price paths, the later an ETS is introduced the lower is 
the probability of CCR investment. The effects of the delay of an ETS are weaker for higher 
carbon prices. If the ETS is introduced after 2025, however, the probability of CCR investment is 
virtually zero for all carbon price paths. 
The right panel of Figure 6 shows that the trigger carbon price increases at an increasing rate 
with the delay of introducing an ETS. 
============================================== 
Fig. 6 The impact of the timing of carbon ETS introduction on CCR investment decision and trigger carbon 
prices over a range of carbon ETS introduction timing 
============================================== 
3) CCR investment cost 
CCR is not a specific plant design; it is more accurate to say that it denotes a spectrum of 
investment and design decisions with varying levels of CCR investment (IEA, 2007b; Bohm et al., 
2007). The spectrum includes leaving some essential space next to a plant for CCS retrofitting or 
adding some extra systems, equipment, and modifications (Rohlfs Madlener, 2013). Thus the 
investment costs involved in CCR may vary widely depending on the original design and location 
of a plant. 
The left panel of Figure 7 shows that higher CCR investment costs lower the probability of 
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investing in a CCR plant. This decline in probability is stronger for lower carbon prices. For low 
carbon prices of 60RMB/tCO2, i.e., price levels in the range of those typically observed in China’s 
ETS pilot programs, the probability of investing in CCR approaches 50% only if CCR investment 
costs are less than half the baseline value. Likewise, if CCR investment costs exceed the baseline 
costs by 50%, the probability that the CCR plant is chosen in stage 1 exceeds 50% only for initial 
carbon prices of about 140RMB/t CO2 and higher. These results further confirm the findings by 
Bohm et al. (2007), Liang et al. (2009) and Rochedo and Szkloit (2013) that only moderate CCR 
investment is economically viable. 
According to the right panel of Figure 7 the trigger carbon price increases almost linearly 
with higher CCR investment costs. These results also imply that the carbon price currently 
observed in China’s ETS pilots can support only low levels of CCR investment. 
============================================== 
Fig. 7 The impact of CCR investment costs on the CCR investment decision and trigger carbon prices over a 
range of CCR investment cost levels 
============================================== 
4) Learning effects of CCS technology 
A high up-front investment cost is a barrier to the diffusion of CCS technology. Because of 
the learning (curve) effects, however, these costs are likely to come down over time (Lohwasser 
and Madlener, 2013; Murphy and Edwards, 2003). The left panel of Figure 8 presents our findings 
regarding the impact of technological learning for CCS technology on plant type choice in stage 1. 
The learning rate is expressed as a percentage point decrease in the investment cost per year. 
Because CCS has so far not been employed on a large scale, the learning rate associated with CCS 
cannot be based on empirical figures. Instead, we rely on findings pertaining to related 
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technologies as a reference point. According to Lohwasser and Madlener (2013), the average 
annual learning rate associated with flue-gas desulfurization between 1970 and 2000 was about 
4.5%. Given the uncertainty of the learning effect, our analysis considers learning effects in a 
range of 1%–10%. As shown in the left panel of Figure 8, for all carbon price paths higher 
learning rates lower the probability of investing in CCR. This decline is greater for lower carbon 
prices. If the learning effects associated with CCS technology are significant, future CCS 
investment costs decrease rapidly, and CCS retrofitting becomes economically viable even for 
Non-CCR plants. In this sense, high CCS learning rates diminish the value of CCR.  
The right panel of Figure 8 illustrates that the trigger carbon price increases roughly linearly 
with the CCS learning rates. 
============================================== 
Fig. 8 The impact of CCS learning effects on CCR investment and trigger carbon prices over a range of 
CCS learning rates 
============================================== 
5) Electricity prices 
Electricity prices in China are currently rather low because of government regulations but are 
expected to increase in the wake of an ongoing reform program that is designed to increase market 
orientation. Higher electricity prices mean higher revenues and higher profits for investors in CCR 
and Non-CCR plants (the revenue effect). However, higher electricity prices also imply higher 
opportunity costs associated with the loss of efficiency when a plant runs in CCS mode. In such a 
case—unless the capacity load factor is increased (via additional investments) after a retrofit—less 
electricity will be generated and sold by the plant (the efficiency loss effect). Thus, in general, the 
net effect of higher electricity prices on CCR investment is driven in opposite directions by two 
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factors, i.e. the revenue effect and the efficiency loss effect. Our simulation results (see the left 
panel of Figure 9) suggest however that the probability of investing in a CCR plant is lower for 
higher electricity prices. Thus, the efficiency loss effect dominates the revenue effect in our 
scenarios. 
============================================== 
Fig. 9 The impact of electricity prices on CCR investment and trigger carbon prices for different electricity 
price scenarios 
============================================== 
As shown in the right panel of Figure 9, the trigger carbon price increases almost linearly 
with the electricity price. Currently, on-grid electricity prices across Chinese provinces range from 
300 RMB/MWh to 500 RMB/MWh. Based on our calculations, these electricity prices correspond 
to a trigger price of between 85 RMB/t CO2 and 130 RMB/t CO2, which is substantially higher 
than the average carbon price observed in the pilot schemes. 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
To limit the economic risks associated with stringent future climate policies, plant investors 
may decide to invest in CCR rather than in conventional Non-CCR plants. A CCR plant involves 
higher current investment costs than a Non-CCR plant, but it can be retrofitted with CCS 
technology at relatively low additional costs at any time in the future. So the plant type choice is a 
critical issue for potential plant investors. This paper develops a novel three-stage CCR investment 
decision model, which incorporates uncertainty in fuel, electricity, and carbon prices and accounts 
for various flexibilities. The latter include the flexibility to decommission a plant in advance, 
flexibility in the timing of a CCS retrofit, and, in particular, operating flexibilty. Thus, depending 
on market conditions, plant operators may decide to run a plant in CCS mode to abate CO2 
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emission or in CCS-off mode to avoid efficiency losses. We parameterize the model to mimic 
investment in a new supercritical pulverized coal plant in China. The model is solved via least 
squares Monte Carlo simulation methods. 
Main findings 
Our simulation results confirm that investing in CCR spurs future CCS retrofitting and thus 
increases CO2 abatement by a plant. This effect is stronger for lower carbon prices. Thus, CCR 
may help promote future CCS retrofitting, in particular, if—as is currently the case in most 
ETSs—carbon prices are low. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that allowing for operating 
flexibility may reduce CCR investment. Thus, analyses ignoring a plant operator’s option to 
temporarily suspend CO2 abatement and instead to purchase the required CO2 certificates on the 
market may overestimate the economic viability of CCR and its potential to abate CO2 emissions. 
We further show that the magnitude of this effect depends on the level of the carbon price. For 
carbon prices below 60 RMB/t CO2 or above 140 RMB/tCO2 the overestimation is rather 
negligible. But for carbon prices observed in the Chinese ETS pilot schemes this bias would be 
significant. 
Our simulation results also show that if CCS investment costs drop significantly over time 
(e.g., because of technological learning), investors are less likely to invest in a CCR plant. Thus, 
government efforts to lower the costs of CCS via support for research, development, and 
demonstration projects may impede investments in CCR. 
The findings of our simulations further suggest that high electricity prices are likely to inhibit 
investment in CCR. The negative opportunity cost effect, which results from the loss in output that 
occurs when running a plant in CCS mode exceeds the positive effect of higher revenues, comes 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
27 
 
into play to discourage such investment. Thus, electricity price increases, such as those envisaged 
in China in the wake of electricity market reforms, will, accordingly, likely discourage investment 
in CCR. This finding highlights the need for policymakers to take into account interaction 
between the electricity market and the carbon market. 
Finally, the results of the case study implies that CCR investment does not appear to be 
economically viable under current conditions in China because of a low carbon price, high carbon 
price risk, the high cost of CCR investment and the high opportunity cost of CCS operation. The 
trigger carbon price supporting the CCR investment in the base case is about 92 RMB/t CO2, 
which is still higher than the current average carbon price in China’s pilot ETSs. 
Policy implications 
Our simulation results show that the impact of policy measures on CCR invstment and CCS 
investment may be complex. Some policies can promote CCR and CCS simultaneously, such as 
starting a carbon pricing policy early, tightening the carbon budget to maintain a high carbon price, 
and implementing market-stabilizing measures to lower the carbon price risk. Other policy 
measures imply a trade-off between investments in CCS and investments in CCR. For example, 
allowing CCS operating flexibility in the future can promote investment in CCS, but may restrain 
investment in CCR. Whether policymakers should allow this flexibility in practice depends on 
their objectives. On the one hand, if policymakers want to promote CCR investment, they should 
inhibit operating flexibility and make CCS operation mandatory. On the other hand, if they want 
to promote immediate investment in CCS, they should allow operating flexibility. Policymakers 
could also promote the sharing of CCS- related knowledge among potential investors, in particular 
regarding the technological options involved in operating the plant in flexible mode. Policies 
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supporting research and development may bring down the cost of CCS investment and thus 
promote CCS development, but they will also restrain early investment in CCR. To avoid 
countervailing effects and to maximize the net benefits over time, policies designed to promote 
CCR and CCS deployment need to be coordinated. 
Limitations and extensions 
The results presented in this paper were based on simulations for an SCPC plant in China. 
Using other technologies would not alter the main qualitative findings. For other technologies, 
though, the conclusions pertaining to the economic viability of CCR investment and the critical 
carbon prices supporting the CCR investment may be different, since other technologies have 
different costs for plant construction, additional CCR, CCS retrofit and operating. In addition, 
while the conceptual model developed for the CCR investment decision process applies to any 
country, application of the GBM model of the electricity and coal price dynamics may be limited 
to the countries like China, where the energy prices are currently regulated and low, yet are 
expected to increase in the future. When this model is used for countries where energy markets are 
liberalized, a mean reverting process is more appropriate. Since China has begun implementing 
market-oriented reforms, future analyses of CCR investment may also use a mean-reverting 
process to adequately reflect the new situation in energy markets. Ideally, model parameterization 
may then also capitalize on mature spot and futures markets. 
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Appendix A: Calculation of cash flow and CO2 abatement  
The cash flow for a plant in period i iCF  can be expressed as  
2i e i fuel i om i TS i CO i
CF R C C C C                                          (A.1) 
where e iR  is the revenues from electricity sales, fuel iC   is the fuel cost, om iC   stands for the 
costs of operation and maintenance (O&M), TS iC   reflects the costs of transportation and 
sequestration of CO2, and 
2CO i
C   stands for the costs of acquiring CO2 certificates. We assume 
that no certificates are allocated for free. Also, the investor takes prices in all input and output 
markets as given. 
Before carbon pricing, i.e. carbon ETS, is introduced (BETS), TS iC  = 2CO iC   = 0, and 
BETS BETS BETS BETS
i e i fuel i om iCF R C C                                               (A.2) 
After the ETS is introduced and before the plant is retrofitted with CCS (BR), 
2CO i
C  >0, 
and 
2
BR BR BR BR BR
i e i fuel i om i CO iCF R C C C                                             (A.3) 
After the ETS is introduced and the plant is retrofitted with CCS, operating the plant in CCS 
mode (CC) means lower revenues from electricity sales, higher costs for O&M, additional costs 
for transportation and sequestration, but lower costs for acquiring certificates. In this case 
2
CC CC CC CC CC CC
i e i fuel i om i TS i CO iCF R C C C C                                        (A.4) 
If investors suspend CCS (SCC), O&M costs drop and TS iC   = 0, but certificate costs are 
higher. In this case  
2
SCC SCC SCC SCC SCC
i e i fuel i om i CO iCF R C C C                                           (A.5)  
Investors can sell the same amount of electricity 
NCCS
e iN   in non-CCS mode as they did 
before the CCS retrofit, so revenues are 
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BETS BR SCC NCCS
e i e i e i e i e iR R R N P                                               (A.6)   
where e iP   is the electricity price in period i . Operating in CCS mode leads to lower electricity 
generation than 
NCCS
e iN  . In this case the revenue is 
CC CCS
e i e i e iR N P                                                          (A.7) 
In each scenario the fuel input (coal consumption) is the same, co iN  . Thus fuel costs are 
BETS BR SCC CC
fuel i fuel i fuel i fuel i co i co iC C C C N P                                        (A.8)   
where co iP   is the price of coal in period i. 
CO2 emissions are 
2
NCCS
CO iN   before a CCS retrofit, and also after a CCS retrofit in non-CCS 
operation mode. The costs of acquiring certificates are then 
2 2 2 2 2
BETS BR SCC NCCS
CO i CO i CO i CO i CO iC C C N P                                          (A.9) 
where 
2CO i
P  is the carbon price in period i .  
In CCS operation mode, CO2 emission 
2
CCS
CO iN   < 2
NCCS
CO iN   and 
2 2 2
CC CCS
CO i CO i CO iC N P                                                     (A.10)           
Note that 
2
CCS
CO iN   >0, reflecting a capture rate of < 100%. The amount of CO2 abated under 
the CCS mode, CAA iN  , is then 
2 2
SCC CC
CAA i CO i CO iN N N                                                    (A.11) 
In CCS mode the costs of CO2 transportation and sequestration are 
CC CC
TS i TS CAA iC c N                                                       (A.12) 
where 
CC
TSc  are the per-unit costs of CO2 transportation and sequestration. 
Before the plant is retrofitted with CCS, CO2 abatement is 0; after the plant is retrofitted it 
is CAA iN   in CCS operation mode, and 0 in non-CCS operation mode. Thus, the level of CO2 
abatement in period i  
C iN   
can be described by 
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00,                                      
0,      
,
r
SCC CC
C i i i
rSCC CC
CAA i i
when T i T
N if CF CF
when T i T
N if CF CF

  
 
  
  
                              
(A.13)
                                    
 
The total amount of CO2 abated during the lifetime of the plant is 
0
T
C i
i
N N 


                                                           
(A.14) 
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Table 1 Technical parameters  
Installed Capacity ( MW) 600 
Construction Cycle (years) 2 
Average Capacity Load (%) 85 
Plant Life cycle (years) 35 
Emissions Factors (t CO2/MWh) 0.79 
Initial Capital Outlay (Million RMB) 
Non-CCR plant 3165.8 
CCR plant 3482.3 
Additional Capital Outlay for CCS retrofit (Million RMB) 
Non-CCR plant 1449.9 
CCR plant 778.8 
Initial O&M cost (Million RMB) 
Non-CCR plant 165.3 
CCR plant 181.8 
Additional O&M Cost for CCS operation (Million RMB/y) 
Non-CCR plant 115.7 
CCR plant 71.1 
Initial Power Supply Efficiency (%) 42 
Efficiency Penalty with CCS (percentage points) 
Non-CCR plant 9.5 
CCR plant 8.5 
CO2 capture rate (%) 80 
Transport, Storage, and Monitoring costs (RMB/t CO2) 50 
Time needed for CCS retrofit (year) 1 
Data sources: Sekar (2005), Liang et al. (2009), Rohlfs and Madlener (2011). 
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Table 2 Economic parameters  
Parameters Value 
Initial electricity price (RMB/MWh) 330 
Initial coal price (RMB/M Btu) 25 
Risk-adjusted electricity price drift rate (%) 3 
Risk-adjusted coal price drift rate (%) 3 
Electricity price volatility (%) 5 
Coal price volatility (%) 10 
Initial carbon price (RMB/t CO2) 50 
Risk-adjusted carbon price drift rate (%) 5 
Carbon price volatility (%) 15 
Correlation coefficient 
electricity-coal 0.6 
electricity-carbon 0.395 
coal-carbon -0.35 
Discount rate (%) 5 
Time of introducing carbon pricing 2017 
Time step length in simulation (year) 1/4 
Number of simulated paths 10000 
Data source: Abadie and Chamorro (2008), Liang et al. (2009), Rohlfs and Madlener (2011) and Mo et al. (2016). 
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Table 3 The impact of initial CCR investment on future CCS retrofitting and CO2 abatement  
Initial carbon prices (RMB/t CO2) 
 
20  40  60  80  100  120  140  
Probability of CCS retrofit (%) 
CCR 86.0  89.1  92.4  95.0  96.1  96.2  96.6  
Non-CCR 73.0  76.2  81.3  86.8  90.1  91.1  91.5  
Difference in probability (% 
points)  
13.0  12.9  11.1  8.2  6.0  5.1  5.1  
CO2 abatement (Mt CO2) 
CCR 1.7  9.5  20.2  31.7  42.4  52.0  60.1  
Non-CCR 1.2  7.8  16.8  26.5  35.7  43.1  49.1  
Difference in CO2 abatement  (Mt 
CO2)  
0.5  1.7  3.4  5.2  6.7  8.9  10.9  
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Highlights 
 
 A novel three-stage carbon capture ready (CCR) investment evaluation model 
under uncertainty was developed. 
 CCR plays a key role to promote future carbon capture and storage (CCS) retrofit 
and carbon abatement. 
 Allowing for operating flexibility of CCS may actually reduce current CCR 
investment. 
 Learning effects of CCS technology may be detrimental to current CCR 
investment. 
 Higher electricity prices may be disincentive for current CCR investment. 
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